WHAT IS A TTP?
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) are the doctrinal building blocks of military action. They describe how forces operate — not what they are (that is ORBAT) or where they go (that is planning). A TTP is specific, repeatable, validated, and owned. This guide assumes zero prior knowledge and builds from first principles across all warfighting domains.
The Three Levels — Defined and Differentiated
T — TACTIC
Definition: A tactic is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. It describes what action a unit takes to accomplish a task — the broad approach chosen from available options. Tactics are selected by commanders and may change between missions based on enemy, terrain, and conditions.
Characteristics: Broad. Intent-driven. Flexible. Commander-selected. Cannot be memorised as a single sequence — they are adaptive frameworks.
Example: "Conduct a flanking attack on the enemy's right to fix his reserves while the main effort penetrates the centre." This is a tactic — it describes the concept of the action, not the detailed steps.
ORBAT Link: Tactics are executed by the units identified in the ORBAT. The BCT, division, or corps in your ORBAT employs a tactic. The tactic cannot exist without knowing which forces are available.
T — TECHNIQUE
Definition: A technique is a non-prescriptive way or method used to perform a mission, function, or task. It describes how an action is performed within the latitude given by a tactic. Multiple valid techniques may exist for a single tactic.
Characteristics: Specific. Task-focused. Adaptable within bounds. Unit-level. Not mandatory — commanders may select among valid alternatives.
Example: "The company establishes a base of fire with two platoons at 400m range while the third platoon conducts a wide envelopment using dead ground." This is a technique — it describes the specific method of executing the flanking tactic.
ORBAT Link: Techniques are executed by the specific companies and platoons listed in the ORBAT's task organisation. The technique's feasibility depends on the unit's equipment (e.g. M2A3 Bradley vs BTR-82A changes applicable techniques fundamentally).
P — PROCEDURE
Definition: A procedure is a standard, detailed sequence of actions that must be followed to perform a task safely and consistently. It describes the exact steps, in order, required to execute an action. Procedures are mandatory — deviation requires explicit authorisation.
Characteristics: Prescriptive. Step-by-step. Mandatory sequence. Individual or team level. Often checklist-based. Repeatable with identical outcome.
Example: "Step 1: Team Leader signals FREEZE. Step 2: All personnel halt and assume the lowest available cover. Step 3: Team Leader identifies threat and confirms sector. Step 4: Radio operator sends contact report on primary net…" This is a procedure — the exact sequence for reacting to contact.
ORBAT Link: Procedures are executed by individual soldiers or teams at the lowest echelons of the ORBAT. A change in organic equipment (e.g. replacing SINCGARS with a new radio) requires a procedure update — identical capability does not mean identical procedure.
What is NOT a TTP
"Mass fires on the decisive point." — This is a principle of war (Mass), not a TTP. It provides no specific method, no sequence, no measurable outcome. Principles guide judgment; TTPs guide action.
"1st Platoon will conduct a feint at grid 542318 at H-30." — This is an order for a specific operation, not a repeatable TTP. Orders are single-use; TTPs are reusable across missions and units.
"In Fallujah 2004, 1/8 Marines found it effective to…" — This is a lesson learned or anecdote. It becomes a candidate TTP only after it is generalised, written, validated, and adopted. Before that, it is an observation.
"Positive identification required before engagement." — This is an ROE. It governs authority to act, not how to act. ROE set the legal/political boundary; TTPs operate within that boundary.
"The AN/PRC-152 operates on 30–512 MHz with 5W output." — This is a technical specification. The TTP associated with this radio describes how to use it in a given operational context, not its technical parameters.
"Multi-Domain Operations require exploiting windows of superiority across all five domains simultaneously." — This is an operational concept (MDO). Concepts generate TTPs; they are not TTPs themselves.
The Hierarchy: How TTPs Nest
| Level | Tactic | Technique | Procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Question answered | WHAT to do | HOW to do it | EXACT steps in order |
| Commander latitude | High — selects from options | Medium — selects among valid alternatives | None — mandatory sequence |
| Typical echelon | Company to Corps | Platoon to Brigade | Individual to Squad |
| Adaptable in execution? | Yes — mission variables drive | Yes — within bounds of tactic | No — deviation requires authority |
| Documentation format | Concept / narrative + diagram | Method description + conditions | Numbered checklist / SOP |
| Validated by | SME consensus + exercise | SME consensus + simulation | Simulation + repetition metrics |
| ORBAT dependency | Force mix and echelon | Specific unit equipment | Individual's organic kit |
| Change frequency | Low — years between major changes | Medium — months to years | High — tied to equipment/threat cycles |
ANATOMY OF A TTP
Every TTP must contain a mandatory core of information to be usable, and an optional extended body to maximise its utility. The anatomy below defines each field, explains why it exists, and shows how it connects to the validation plan. A TTP without a validation plan is an untested assumption — not doctrine.
Mandatory Core Fields
Optional Extended Fields
TTP Status Lifecycle
DOMAIN-SPECIFIC TTP STRUCTURES
TTPs differ fundamentally across warfighting domains. What constitutes a "procedure" in Land warfare (a step-by-step drill) differs from a cyber "procedure" (a scripted tool execution sequence) or a Space "procedure" (a satellite tasking checklist). This section maps TTP characteristics, aggregation levels, and examples across all recognised domains.
Land Domain TTPs
| TTP Example | Type | Echelon | Validation Method | Key Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Frontal attack to fix while flanking | TACTIC | Company–Battalion | SME + Exercise | 2:1 superiority min, clear flanks |
| Bounding overwatch (alternate) | TECHNIQUE | Platoon–Company | SME + Simulation | Open terrain, ≥2 elements |
| React to contact — far ambush | PROCEDURE | Squad–Platoon | Repetition metrics | Contact >300m, dismounted |
| Hasty breach of wire obstacle | PROCEDURE | Squad–Section | SME + Sim + RPA | Bangalore torpedo available |
| Combined arms assault (ABCT) | TACTIC | Battalion–Brigade | SME + Exercise (BCTP) | Tank-Mech ratio ≥1:1 |
| Urban CQB room clearance | PROCEDURE | Fire Team–Squad | RPA + Simulation | Confined space, dismounted |
| RSTA screen employment | TECHNIQUE | Brigade–Division | SME consensus | SBCT / Stryker organic scouts |
| Counter-UAS low-echelon defence | TECHNIQUE | Company–Battalion | Sim + SME | Class 1–3 UAS threat, SHORAD organic |
Maritime Domain TTPs
| TTP Example | Type | Platform/Echelon | Validation | Key Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CSG layered air defence employment | TACTIC | Strike Group | SME + COMPUTEX | CVN + ≥2 DDG, AEGIS BMD |
| SSN approach to firing position | TECHNIQUE | Submarine | SME + Sim | Classified — passive sonar environment |
| UNREP (VERTREP) procedure | PROCEDURE | Ship pair | Repetition + SME | Sea state ≤3, ≥10kt SOA |
| MCM route survey — shallow water | TECHNIQUE | MCM vessel pair | SME + Sim + RPA | Depth <40m, mine threat confirmed |
| Amphibious assault wave sequencing | TACTIC | ARG/MEU | SME + Exercise (JTFEX) | LCAC/LCU + helo assets, PLDR |
| Anti-submarine barrier patrol | TECHNIQUE | SNMG + MPA | SME + COMPUTEX | SSN + MPA + sonobuoy coverage |
Air Domain TTPs
| TTP Example | Type | Platform | Validation | Key Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SEAD package execution | TACTIC | Mixed package (F-16CJ + EA-18G) | SME + Red Flag Exercise | SA-10/S-400 threat, AWACS support |
| BVR engagement — 4th gen | TECHNIQUE | F-15C/Typhoon | SME + sim (ACMI) | AIM-120 + radar lock, no chaff/flare |
| Tanker hook-up procedure (probe/drogue) | PROCEDURE | Receiver aircraft | Repetition + SME | Day VMC, speed/altitude bracket |
| CAS — 9-line JTAC call for fire | PROCEDURE | Any CAS platform | SME + RPA + Sim | JTAC present, positive ID, ROE clear |
| Strike package formation management | TECHNIQUE | 4-ship package | SME + ACMI | ECM on, radio comms EMCON plan |
| Helicopter NVG confined area landing | PROCEDURE | UH-60M/CH-47F | Repetition + SME + Sim | NVG, LZ recce complete, abort criteria set |
Space Domain TTPs
| TTP Example | Type | Asset/Echelon | Validation | Key Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Satellite tasking prioritisation (JFC support) | TACTIC | Delta/JFSCC | SME + Sim (Schriever Wargame) | Multi-theatre demand, limited revisit windows |
| EO satellite tasking for time-sensitive target | TECHNIQUE | Delta 2 / ISR squadron | SME + Sim | Cloud cover <30%, target within sensor FOV |
| GPS jamming mitigation procedure | PROCEDURE | Individual platform | Sim + RPA | M-code receiver, alternative PNT available |
| SATCOM link continuity — comm degraded | PROCEDURE | Ground terminal operator | SME + Sim | Primary band jammed, alternate freq plan loaded |
| SDA reporting — RSO conjunction alert | PROCEDURE | 18th Space Control Sqn | SME consensus | Conjunction probability >1:1000, manoeuvrable asset |
Cyber & Electronic Warfare TTPs
| TTP Example | Type | Echelon | Validation | Key Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EW spectrum denial to support manoeuvre | TACTIC | Brigade–Division | SME + Exercise | EW BN organic, target comms identified |
| Direction-finding + geolocation of emitter | TECHNIQUE | MI Coy–Bn | SME + Sim | ≥3 collection platforms, 3D baseline |
| CREW system activation sequence | PROCEDURE | Vehicle crew | Repetition + SME | RCIED threat confirmed, CREW installed |
| Defensive cyberspace — incident response | PROCEDURE | CPT team | Sim (cyber range) + SME | Network intrusion detected, authority granted |
| Offensive cyber effects integration with fires | TACTIC | JTF / CEMA cell | SME + Sim (classified) | Cyber effects authority (Title 10/50), deconfliction |
Special Operations Forces TTPs
| TTP Example | Type | Echelon | Validation | Key Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unconventional warfare network development | TACTIC | ODA / ODB | SME + RPA + historical | Permissive HN government or resistance willing |
| Direct action — sequential room clearance | PROCEDURE | Assault team | RPA + Repetition | Night / NVG, breacher organic, HVT location fixed |
| Maritime infiltration — CRRC beach landing | TECHNIQUE | SEAL platoon | SME + Sim + RPA | Sea state ≤2, CRRC × 2, surf zone recce |
| Special Reconnaissance static OP | TECHNIQUE | ODA / SEAL pair | SME + RPA | Covert insertion, observation window ≥72 hr |
| Sensitive site exploitation (SSE) | PROCEDURE | ODA / assault element | SME + RPA | Site secured, TECHINT teams available, time limit set |
Joint & Information Domain TTPs
| TTP Example | Type | Echelon | Validation | Key Condition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Joint fires integration (JFIRE) | TECHNIQUE | JTAC / FSO / JFACC | SME + Exercise (JFIRES) | JTAC qualified, FSCL established, positive ID |
| MISO product approval and dissemination | PROCEDURE | JPOTF | SME + RPA | Approval authority delegated, target audience analysis complete |
| Deception operation (MILDEC) planning | TACTIC | JTF / Component | SME + RPA (wargame) | Deception story coherent, feedback indicators defined |
| OPSEC survey and countermeasure | PROCEDURE | Any HQ | SME consensus | Pre-operation, OPSEC officer assigned |
| Multi-domain synchronisation in CAOC | TACTIC | CAOC / JAOC | SME + Exercise (Austere Challenge) | All domain components represented, ATO integrated |
TTP LIBRARY
The library aggregates all submitted and validated TTPs. Filter by domain, type, validation method, or status. Click any card to expand the full TTP record. New TTPs are submitted via the Submit tab. The library is the authoritative reference for training planning and operational TTP selection.
SUBMIT A TTP
Use this form to register a new TTP. Required fields are marked ★. Optional fields are marked [opt]. All submitted TTPs enter DRAFT status and must have a validation plan attached before advancing to review. The form enforces TTP classification rules — it will alert you if you attempt to mix echelon levels inappropriately.
VALIDATION METHODS
A TTP without validation is an untested assumption. Validation is the process by which a TTP is tested against measurable criteria to determine if it achieves the stated standards under the stated conditions. Three formal validation methods are recognised: SME Consensus, Simulation, and Role-Play Analysis. Each has defined strengths, limitations, and requirements. Combination validation is preferred for Tactical and above.
SME Consensus — Full Reference
- Minimum 3 SMEs with direct operational experience at the TTP's echelon and domain. Peer review by non-practitioners is insufficient.
- Diversity requirement: Panel must represent at least two different units/organisations to prevent groupthink. A panel of 3 SMEs from the same battalion is weaker than 3 from different units.
- Currency requirement: SME experience must be within the past 5 years for rapidly changing domains (Cyber, EW, SOF), or within the past 10 years for slower-changing domains (general land warfare principles).
- Conflict of interest check: SMEs who authored the TTP may participate but must declare their involvement. They may not serve as voting members for their own TTP.
- Adversary expertise: At least one SME should have expertise in the adversary TTPs that this TTP is designed to counter or exploit.
- Domain specialist plus generalist: At least one SME should be a domain specialist (e.g. SF CQB expert for a SOF procedure) and one a broader operations generalist to check for second-order effects.
| Step | Action | Output | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Panel Convening | SME panel constituted; roles assigned; TTP distributed for independent pre-read | Panel membership list + pre-read receipt | D-14 to D-7 |
| 2. Independent Review | Each SME reviews TTP against their experience independently, without group influence | Individual comment sheets | D-7 to D-1 |
| 3. Structured Discussion | Facilitated panel meeting. Each section of TTP discussed against validation criteria. Delphi rounds if needed to resolve disagreement. | Minutes + resolution record | D0 (1–3 days) |
| 4. Consensus Vote | Formal vote per validation criteria. Record individual votes and reasoning. | Voting record with rationale | End of D0 session |
| 5. Minority Report | Any dissenting SME may append a minority report. Minority report is included in the TTP record. | Minority report (if applicable) | D0 + 3 days |
| 6. Validation Certificate | Panel chair signs validation certificate. TTP advances to VALIDATED status. | Signed validation certificate | D0 + 5 days |
| 7. Review Schedule | Set mandatory review date (typically 2–3 years, or sooner if threat/equipment changes) | Review date in TTP record | At certificate signing |
- Seniority bias: The most senior SME dominates discussion, suppressing valid dissent from junior practitioners with more recent experience. Mitigation: anonymous initial voting rounds.
- Availability bias: Panel over-indexes on recent high-profile cases (e.g. a specific battle). Mitigation: require SMEs to reference at least 3 independent examples.
- Author's authority: TTP author explains the TTP during the review, inadvertently advocating rather than submitting to independent review. Mitigation: written submission only for independent review phase.
- Missing dissent handling: Panel reaches consensus but dissenter withdraws their objection under social pressure rather than genuine persuasion. Mitigation: structured written dissent process, not open vote.
- Inappropriate SME selection: SMEs selected for availability rather than expertise. A logistics colonel validating a CQB procedure. Mitigation: mandatory experience criteria in panel charter.
Simulation Validation — Full Reference
| Simulation Type | Best For | Systems (examples) | Fidelity Level | Cost Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Live exercise (field) | Procedures requiring physical execution; highest fidelity human factors | Field training exercise (FTX), JRTC/NTC rotation | Highest | Very High |
| Virtual / constructive simulation | Tactics and Techniques at echelon; large-scale force interactions | OneSAF, JCATS, VBS4, AFSIM, EADSIM | High | Medium |
| Hardware-in-the-loop (HWIL) | Procedures using specific equipment; sensor/weapon system procedures | Platform-specific test rigs | Very High (for systems) | High |
| Air combat manoeuvring instrumentation (ACMI) | Air-to-air tactics and techniques; BVR/WVR engagement procedures | TACTS/ACMI range (Nellis, Decimomannu) | High | High |
| Cyber range | Cyber procedures; EW frequency management; network defence | National Cyber Range, classified equivalents | High (for cyber) | Medium |
| Tabletop / wargame simulation | Tactics at operational level; strategic-level procedures | Matrix-style wargames, Connexus, MAP-HT | Low–Medium | Low |
| Agent-based model | Large-scale emergent behaviour; system-of-systems interaction | MANA, NetLogo, PYTHAGORAS | Variable | Low–Medium |
- Minimum runs: At least 30 independent runs per scenario variant to achieve basic statistical validity. For stochastic simulations, 100+ runs are preferred.
- Variable isolation: Test one TTP change at a time. If multiple TTPs are tested simultaneously, attribution of outcomes becomes impossible.
- Baseline comparison: Always run a baseline scenario (TTP not implemented / current practice) against the candidate TTP. The comparison is what validates improvement.
- Scenario variants: Test across at least 3 scenario variants representing the range of conditions in which the TTP claims to be valid. A TTP valid in one scenario but failing in others is conditionally valid only.
- Monte Carlo sensitivity: Vary key parameters (threat capability, weather, attrition rates) within realistic bounds to assess TTP robustness. A TTP that passes only under best-case conditions is fragile.
- Report confidence intervals: All metrics must be reported with confidence intervals, not point estimates. "TTP achieves 85% success rate (CI 78–92%, n=50)" is valid; "TTP achieves 85% success" is not.
Role-Play Analysis — Full Reference
| RPA Format | Description | Ideal TTP Type | Min Participants | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Structured TTX | Scenario-driven table discussion; participants respond to injects as they would in real operations | Tactics / Techniques | 6–12 | 4–8 hours |
| Command Post Exercise (CPX) | Full C2 element exercises without troops; communications and orders flow tested | Tactics (Company+) | 10–30 | 2–5 days |
| Seminar wargame | Facilitated structured discussion with formal turns and adjudication | Tactics (Operational) | 8–20 | 1–3 days |
| Force-on-force roleplay | BLUFOR vs OPFOR teams play out TTP with active opposition; realistic adversary response | All types | 8–16 | 4–16 hours |
| Red Team analysis | Independent adversary-perspective team attempts to defeat / exploit the TTP | Procedures / Techniques | 3–6 (red team) | 1–3 days |
| JTAC / aircrew verbal simulation | Voice-only call-for-fire / CAS procedures rehearsed without aircraft | SOF / Air CAS procedures | 2–4 | 1–4 hours |
- Test every decision point: Map the TTP's decision nodes and design one inject per decision point. If the TTP has no explicit decision points, add them — every TTP has implicit ones.
- Include failure injects: At least 30% of injects should represent conditions where the TTP is expected to fail or require adaptation. If participants can't identify failure modes, the TTP is incomplete.
- Adversary agency: OPFOR injects must represent intelligent, adaptive adversary responses — not passive targets. An adversary who does not react to the TTP being employed is not a valid test.
- Information degradation: Include injects representing comms failure, intelligence gaps, and fratricide risk. TTPs that only work under perfect information are operationally fragile.
- Time pressure: Inject time constraints that approximate real operational tempo. TTPs validated in unlimited time conditions may fail under operational pressure.
- After-action capture: Every inject response must be documented with the reasoning behind decisions. This is the analytical basis for the validation finding.
Method Selection Matrix
| TTP Type / Characteristic | SME Consensus | Simulation | Role-Play Analysis | Recommended Combination |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tactic (Company–Corps) | PRIMARY | SUPPLEMENTAL | SUPPLEMENTAL | SME + RPA (CPX) |
| Technique (Platoon–Brigade) | SUPPLEMENTAL | PRIMARY | SUPPLEMENTAL | SME + Simulation |
| Procedure (Individual–Squad) | SUPPLEMENTAL | PRIMARY | SUPPLEMENTAL | Simulation + Repetition metrics |
| SOF TTP (any type) | PRIMARY | LIMITED | PRIMARY | SME + RPA (OPSEC-sensitive) |
| Cyber / EW TTP | SUPPLEMENTAL | PRIMARY | SUPPLEMENTAL | Simulation (cyber range) + SME |
| Space Domain TTP | PRIMARY | PRIMARY | N/A (mostly) | SME + Sim (Schriever WG) |
| Joint / Multi-Domain TTP | PRIMARY | SUPPLEMENTAL | PRIMARY | SME + RPA (joint exercise) |
| Information Domain TTP | PRIMARY | LIMITED | PRIMARY | SME + RPA (red team) |
| Classified TTP (SECRET+) | PRIMARY | LIMITED | PRIMARY | SME + RPA (closed environment) |
| Coalition / NATO TTP | PRIMARY (multi-nation panel) | SUPPLEMENTAL | PRIMARY (LIVEX) | Multi-nation SME + Exercise |
| High-Risk / Fratricide-Prone | SUPPLEMENTAL | PRIMARY | PRIMARY | ALL THREE METHODS REQUIRED |
| Emergent / Rapid-Cycle (combat) | PRIMARY (accelerated) | TIME-LIMITED | If time allows | Accelerated SME (AAR-based) |
TTP AGGREGATION
TTP aggregation is the process of combining, reconciling, and analysing TTPs across multiple domains, echelons, and units to identify patterns, gaps, conflicts, and doctrine candidates. It is the bridge between individual TTP submissions and the institutional knowledge base. Aggregation reveals what is known, what is assumed, and where validation gaps exist.
Aggregation by Level
| Aggregation Goal | Method | Output | Responsible Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standardise common drills across units | Compare procedure steps across submitting units; identify deviations | Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) | Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) / School of Infantry |
| Identify training gaps | Map procedures to METL tasks; identify tasks with no validated procedure | Training gap analysis | Unit S3/G3 |
| Capture combat lessons | AAR-based procedure capture from deployed units; rapid aggregation cycle | Lessons Learned report → TTP candidate | Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) |
| Update for new equipment | Identify all procedures dependent on replaced equipment; trigger mandatory update | Updated procedure + change record | Proponent school / TRADOC |
| Aggregation Goal | Method | Output |
|---|---|---|
| Technique compatibility check | Matrix subordinate unit techniques against each other; identify deconfliction requirements | Technique compatibility matrix + deconfliction SOP |
| Combined arms integration | Validate that infantry, armour, and fire support techniques are synchronised at key events (breach, exploitation) | Combined arms technique document |
| Training programme design | Map validated techniques to training events; sequence from individual through collective | Unit collective training plan |
| ORBAT-TTP alignment | Validate that techniques are feasible given the unit's equipment as listed in ORBAT. Update when ORBAT changes. | ORBAT-referenced TTP validity matrix |
| Aggregation Goal | Method | Output |
|---|---|---|
| Tactic synchronisation with operational concept | Map BCT tactics to division CONOPS; validate logical coherence | Tactic coherence assessment |
| Fire support integration | Validate that fires TTPs at BCT level are synchronised with DIVARTY HIMARS/MLRS employment TTPs | Fire support integration matrix |
| CSS TTP alignment | Validate that manoeuvre TTPs do not exceed sustainment TTPs' capacity (fuel, ammo, CASEVAC) | CSS feasibility assessment per TTP |
| Cross-domain enabler integration | Map aviation, EW, cyber, and space TTPs as enablers to manoeuvre TTPs; validate synchronisation timing | Multi-domain TTP synchronisation matrix |
| Aggregation Goal | Method | Output |
|---|---|---|
| Doctrine candidate identification | Identify TTPs validated by ≥3 independent formations; nominate for doctrinal publication | Doctrine nomination package |
| Multi-corps TTP deconfliction | Compare TTPs of corps adjacent to each other; identify boundary and coordination TTP conflicts | Corps boundary TTP standard |
| Campaign sustainability analysis | Analyse whether TTP combinations are sustainable over extended campaign (logistics, personnel, equipment cycle) | Campaign TTP sustainability assessment |
| Theatre-wide EW/Cyber TTP integration | Synchronise cyber and EW TTPs across components to avoid mutual interference | Theatre electromagnetic warfare deconfliction matrix |
| Aggregation Goal | Method | Output |
|---|---|---|
| Service TTP interoperability validation | Cross-service SME panel reviews comparable TTPs; identifies integration failures | Joint TTP integration assessment |
| NATO STANAG candidate development | Multi-nation SME review of aligned national TTPs; develop common standard | STANAG Proposal (NSPA submission) |
| Joint Publication update nomination | Map validated joint TTPs to relevant JP; identify outdated guidance | JP update package (submitted to JCIDS) |
| Coalition TTP library development | Aggregate TTPs from coalition nations; identify compatible vs conflicting approaches | Coalition TTP compatibility matrix + REL TO distribution list |
| Cross-Domain Pair | Integration Challenge | Aggregation Output |
|---|---|---|
| Land + Space | Land TTPs assuming GPS, SATCOM, or imagery must be validated against degraded space scenarios | GPS-denied fallback procedures for each GPS-dependent TTP |
| Land + Cyber | Manoeuvre TTPs assuming digital C2 (FBCB2, ATAK) must have offline/manual fallbacks validated | Degraded comms alternatives for all digital-C2-dependent TTPs |
| Air + Cyber/EW | Air TTPs assume radar, datalink, and AWACS — all EW-vulnerable. GPS jamming affects precision munitions TTPs. | EW-degraded variants of all air TTPs involving datalinks or GPS |
| Maritime + Space | CSG TTPs assume SATCOM and GPS navigation. Anti-access scenarios include space denial. | EMCON + GPS-denied navigation procedures as TTP companions |
| SOF + Information | SOF TTPs create information effects (both deliberate and inadvertent). OPSEC TTPs must be paired. | OPSEC companion TTP for every SOF operational TTP |
| All Domains + EW | Every domain's TTPs have EW-vulnerable components. Cross-domain aggregation reveals EW dependency map. | Theatre-wide EW vulnerability assessment by TTP dependency |
🎮 AGENT-BASED TTP VALIDATION SIMULATOR
Runs a real agent-based model at 20× speed. BLUFOR and OPFOR units are instantiated with positions, movement orders, engagement ranges, morale, and C2 links derived from the TTP type and scenario. Each tick agents sense, decide, and act. The canvas renders live. Multiple runs produce statistically valid results with confidence intervals.
📖 TTP GLOSSARY
Key terms used in TTP documentation, validation, and doctrine. Cross-referenced with the ORBAT Guide glossary where terms overlap. Definitions follow FM 7-0, NATO AAP-06, and JP 1-02 unless otherwise noted.
🕸 TTP DEPENDENCY GRAPH
Interactive network showing prerequisite chains, technique dependencies, and compound TTP packages. Nodes are colour-coded by type. Drag to pan, scroll to zoom. Click any node for the full TTP record. Arrows point from prerequisite → dependent — mastering the source TTP is required before the target can be executed.
📈 VALIDATION SCORE DASHBOARD
Each TTP receives a composite Validation Health Score (0–100) computed across six weighted dimensions. The score is not a pass/fail — it measures the robustness and currency of the validation evidence. Low scores flag TTPs requiring re-validation, proponent reassignment, or review scheduling before operational use.
| Dimension | Weight | What it measures | Max points |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validation method quality | 30% | Number and type of validation methods used; combination bonus | 30 |
| Validation currency | 20% | Time since last validation or review (decays over 3 years) | 20 |
| Threat model recency | 15% | Whether conditions reference current threat environment | 15 |
| Documentation completeness | 15% | Mandatory fields populated, optional fields present | 15 |
| Hazard assessment | 10% | Fratricide risk explicitly assessed and mitigated | 10 |
| Proponent assignment | 10% | Responsible owner identified; review schedule set | 10 |
🔗 ORBAT ↔ TTP CROSS-REFERENCE
Select a unit type or echelon from the ORBAT tree and instantly see: which TTPs are valid for that unit's organic equipment, which TTPs require specific assets from that node, and which TTPs degrade or fail if that unit is below strength or cross-attached. This is the operational bridge between the ORBAT Guide and the TTP library.
SELECT UNIT / ECHELON FROM ORBAT
⚡ TTP CONFLICT DETECTOR
Automatically scans the TTP library for pairs that share incompatible characteristics: conflicting frequencies, mutually exclusive conditions, simultaneous time-window claims, opposing fratricide risk profiles, or contradictory echelon assumptions. Critical for combined arms synchronisation. Run the scan whenever new TTPs are added.