Electronic Warfare

DOCTRINAL REFERENCE

Electronic Warfare (EW) comprises all military actions involving the use of electromagnetic energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) or to attack the enemy. It is divided into three primary pillars: Electronic Support (ES), Electronic Attack (EA), and Electronic Protection (EP).

Electronic Support (ES)

Passive collection and exploitation of electromagnetic emissions for intelligence, warning, and targeting support.

SIGINTELINTCOMINTESMRWR

Electronic Attack (EA)

Offensive use of electromagnetic energy to degrade, neutralize or destroy enemy capability to use the spectrum.

JammingDeceptionHPMCyber-EW

Electronic Protection (EP)

Active and passive measures to protect friendly use of the spectrum against adversary EW and natural interference.

ECCMLPI/LPDFrequency Agility

Electromagnetic Spectrum — EW Frequency Bands

Hover over band to inspect —

EW vs. Cyber vs. IO

Domain	Medium	Effect
EW	EM Spectrum	Deny/degrade spectrum use
Cyber	Networks	Compromise/exploit data
IO	Cognitive	Influence decision-making
Cyber-EW	Combined	Hybrid degradation

Friis Transmission Equation

Radar Range & Jamming

Spherical Wave Propagation — Power Density vs. Distance (1/R² Law)

Tx Power (W) 1000 W

Frequency (GHz) 9 GHz

S @ R₁:—

S @ R₂:—

2×R →:–6 dB

Every doubling of range reduces power density by 6 dB (factor of 4). Radar two-way path: 12 dB per range doubling (R⁴ dependence).

EW Kill Chain — Detect → Identify → Locate → Plan → Act → Assess

<1ms

React time for high-speed EW

100+

EW frequency bands tracked

360°

Full-sphere spectral awareness

dB·m⁻²

Power density — fundamental metric

PILLAR I

Electronic Support (ES)

ES comprises passive measures performed to search for, intercept, identify and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy. It provides real-time EW intelligence, tactical warning, and target cueing for EA missions. ES requires no transmission — it is inherently covert.

ES Techniques — Grouped by Function

Direction Finding (DF) Simulator

Emitter Az 45°

Frequency (MHz) 3000 MHz

DF Method

BEARING:045.0°

ERROR:±2.1°

CONF:94%

Spectrum Monitoring — Live

Center (MHz) 9000 MHz

Span 500 MHz

Emitter Identification Parameters

Pulse Width (PW)1.2 μs

Pulse Rep. Interval (PRI)500 μs

RF Frequency9000 MHz

Scan TypeCircular

Scan Period3.0 s

ELINT ClassAIR SEARCH

Threat IDSA-10/S-300PMU

ModeSEARCH

SIGINT Disciplines

Type	Source	Product
ELINT	Non-comms emitters	Radar params, modes
COMINT	Communications	Messages, intent
FISINT	Foreign instrumentation	Telemetry, guidance
MASINT	Multi-sensor	Signatures, anomalies

DF Accuracy vs. Baseline

ES Platforms

RC-135V/W Rivet Joint AIRBORNE

Dedicated SIGINT/ELINT aircraft. 14 operator stations. Covers 20 MHz–18 GHz. COMINT/ELINT real-time relay to national agencies.

E-8C JSTARS / EP-3E Aries AIRBORNE

Ground surveillance (JSTARS) and naval SIGINT (Aries II). Tactical real-time ELINT dissemination to theater commanders.

SBIRS / DSP (Space-based) SPACE

IR missile warning + RF signature collection from GEO/HEO orbits. Sub-second detect-to-report for ballistic launches.

PILLAR II

Electronic Attack (EA)

EA uses electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation munitions to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralising, or destroying enemy combat capability. EA encompasses active jamming (noise and deception), directed energy weapons (HPM, HEL), anti-radiation missiles, and communications/navigation denial. Expendable decoys (chaff, flares) are Electronic Protection measures employed by the platform being attacked.

EA Techniques — Grouped by Function

Jamming Simulator

Jammer Type

J/S Ratio (dB) +10 dB

Radar Frequency 9 GHz

MODE:SPOT JAM

J/S:+10.0 dB

EFFECT:DEGRADED

Deception Jamming — DRFM

Delay (μs) 20 μs

Doppler Shift (Hz) +1200 Hz

Technique

FALSE RANGE:+3.0 km

FALSE SPEED:+185 m/s

GATE STATUS:CAPTURED

Key EA Equations

Burn-through: as R_jt increases, J/S falls as R². At burn-through range the radar regains track despite jamming — jammer must close range or increase power.

Jamming J/S Effectiveness

J/S < 0 dBNo Effect

0–6 dBMarginal

6–14 dBDegraded

14–20 dBDenied

>20 dBObliterated

EA Platforms

EA-18G GrowlerALQ-218/99

EC-130H Compass CallCOMMS JAM

B-52 / Rivet AceESCORT

MALD-JDECOY

SEWIP Block 3NAVAL

Burn-Through Range

At burn-through range, radar regains track despite jamming

PILLAR III

Electronic Protection (EP)

EP encompasses all actions taken to protect friendly personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. EP includes ECCM, LPI/LPD techniques, emission control, and spectrum management.

EP Techniques — Grouped by Function

Frequency Hopping Simulator

Hop Rate (hops/s) 1000 hps

Bandwidth (MHz) 400 MHz

PROCESSING GAIN:+26 dB

JAM RESISTANCE:HIGH

LPI Radar Waveforms

Waveform

Peak Power (W) 100 W

Time-Bandwidth Product1500

Intercept ProbabilityLow (<5%)

ECCM Score Dashboard

Frequency Agility 95%

Pulse Compression 88%

Sidelobe Cancellation 80%

Adaptive Nulling 75%

EMCON Compliance 60%

Spread Spectrum 50%

EP Key Metrics

EMCON Level IALL EMISSIONS OFF

EMCON Level IIESSENTIAL ONLY

EMCON Level IIIUNRESTRICTED

EMCON — Emission Control: discipline of managing radio emissions to deny the enemy intercept opportunity.

Chaff Dipole Cut Length

X-band (10 GHz)15 mm

S-band (3 GHz)50 mm

L-band (1 GHz)150 mm

Each dipole re-radiates as a half-wave resonant element. Bundles contain millions of dipoles creating an RCS bloom orders of magnitude above the dispensing aircraft.

Expendable Decoy Comparison

ChaffRF / Radar

IR Flare (MTV)2–5 μm IR

Active RF Decoy (MALD-J)RF + IR

Towed Decoy (ALE-50)RF active

Nulka (naval)RF active

All expendables are Electronic Protection — they protect the emitting platform. They do not attack enemy systems.

THREAT REFERENCE

Target Platforms & Systems

EW is applied across all domains. This section details the primary threat and friendly platforms, their EW vulnerabilities, and the appropriate countermeasure selection for each. Platforms span air, ground, naval, space, and cyber-electromagnetic.

Platform Selector

EW Countermeasure Matrix — Platform vs. Technique

Platform / System	Primary Sensor	ES Applicable	EA Technique	EP Countermeasure	Vulnerability
SAM Radar (S-300/400)	X/S-band Pulse	ELINT, COMINT, DF	Spot Jam, DRFM, ARM	Freq Agility, SLC	Emission signature
AEW&C (E-3/A-50)	L-band Rotodome	ELINT, RWR	Barrage Jam, Escort Jam	Moving Target Indication	Large RCS, predictable orbit
Naval Warship (DDG)	Multi-band AESA	SIGINT, ESM	Chaff, SEWIP, Decoy	CIWS, EMCON	Comm link saturation
UAV / Drone	EO/IR, SAR	COMINT (datalink)	GPS Spoof, Comms Jam	Anti-spoof GNSS, FHSS	GPS/datalink dependency
Military Satellite	EO, SAR, SIGINT	Orbital ELINT, RF	Uplink Jam, HPM, Cyber	Crypto, frequency agility	Ground link exposure
Armoured Vehicle	Battlefield radar, IFF	MASINT, Acoustic	IFF Spoof, Comms Jam	Shielding, EMCON	Radio comms exposure
Ground Control Station	Datalink, Video feed	COMINT, DF	Uplink/Downlink Jam	Encryption, Spread Spec	Fixed site, high emission

RCS Reference Values

Target	RCS (m²)	dBsm
Fighter (F-16)	5	+7
Stealth (F-22)	0.0001	-40
Bomber (B-52)	100	+20
UAV (Predator)	0.5	-3
Warship (DDG)	3000	+35
Person (standing)	1	0

Frequency vs. Platform Range

GPS/GNSS Jamming & Spoofing

GPS Jamming DENY

Noise broadcast on L1 (1575.42 MHz) / L2 (1227.60 MHz) overloads receiver correlators. Even low-power jammers (1W) can deny GPS at 30+ km. Affects navigation, timing, and precision-guided munitions.

GPS Spoofing DECEIVE

Transmits fake satellite signals with incorrect position/time data. Receiver accepts false location — platform navigates to wrong destination. Used against Iranian-captured RQ-170 in 2011.

Anti-Spoof EP PROTECT

M-code military GPS with AES encryption, null-steering antenna to reject off-axis spoof signals, INS/GPS hybrid navigation, RAIM integrity monitoring.